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ABSTRACT  
Cognitive   Linguistics   (CL)   believes   that   the   study   of   language   can   be   informative   with  
regards   to  human   thought  processes.   If   language   is   built   on   top  of  more  basic,   non-­‐‑linguistic  
cognitive   skills,   then   some   of   the  mechanisms   behind   language  must   surely   also   be   used   in  
other  areas  of  cognition.  This  means  that  some  of  the  explanations  proposed  by  CL  could  help  
us   clarify   aspects   of   human   behavior   that   go  well   beyond   language.   The   present  work   is   an  
attempt  at   looking  at   a  number  of  mechanisms  used   in  CL   to  explain   language,   and   see  how  
they  shed  light  on  one  specific  human  area:  that  of  our  current  legal  system.  The  claim  is  that  
the   processes   that   constitute   our   legal   systems   can   be   seen   from   a   fresh   perspective   and   can  
probably  be  better  understood  using  some  of  the  insights  of  cognitive  linguistics.  We  will  focus  
preferentially  on  mechanisms  such  as  categorization  processes,  the  windowing  of  attention,  and  
framing  strategies,  including  the  use  of  metaphors.    
KEYWORDS:  categorization;  metaphor;  windowing  of  attention;   framing;  metaphoric   framing;  
legal  systems.  
  
LINGÜÍSTICA  COGNITIVA  Y  LA  LEY  
RESUMEN  
La   Lingüística   Cognitiva   (LC)   sostiene   que   el   estudio   del   lenguaje   puede   ofrecernos  
información  sobre  algunos  de   los  procesos  cognitivos  humanos.  Si  el   lenguaje  está  construido  
sobre   capacidades   no   lingüísticas   más   básicas,   entonces   algunos   de   los   mecanismos   que  
subyacen  al  lenguaje  deben  con  toda  probabilidad  ser  utilizados  en  otras  áreas  de  la  cognición.  
Esto  quiere  decir  que  la  LC  podría  ayudarnos  a  clarificar  aspectos  del  comportamiento  humano  
que   van  más   allá   del   lenguaje.   El   presente   trabajo   es   un   intento   de   examinar   algunos   de   los  
mecanismos  utilizados  en   la  LC  para  explicar   los  procesos   lingüísticos  y  ver  hasta  qué  punto  
son  útiles  para   iluminar  un   área   específica  de   la   actividad  humana:  nuestro   sistema   legal.   La  
afirmación   es   que   los   procesos   que   constituyen   nuestros   sistemas   legales   pueden   ser   vistos  
desde   una   perspectiva   novedosa   y   probablemente   pueden   ser   entendidos   de   manera   más  
integradora,   utilizando   algunas   de   las   explicaciones   utilizadas   en   LC.   Nos   centraremos   de  
manera   especial   en   mecanismos   como   los   procesos   de   categorización,   la   focalización   de   la  
atención   y   las   estrategias   de   enmarcado   (framing),   incluyendo   las   estrategias   basadas   en   la  
conceptualización  metafórica  
PALABRAS  CLAVE: categorización;  metáfora;  vocalización  de  la  atención;  enmarcado;  enmarcado  
metafórico;  sistemas  legales. 
	  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive  Linguistics  (henceforth,  CL)  deems  language  not  as  an  autonomous,  
independent   facet   of   cognition   but,   rather,   as   inextricably   related   to   other  
mental   processes   such   as   categorization,   perception,   memory,   attention   or  
emotion,  to  name  a  few.  That  is  why  CL  thinks  that  a  close  examination  of  the  
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mechanisms  that  explain  language  can  help  us  unveil  some  of  the  strategies  we  
use   in   other   areas   of   cognition.   Therefore,   it   is   possible   that   some   of   the  
explanations  proposed  by  CL  can  be  effectively  employed  to  elucidate  facets  of  
human   behavior   that   go   well   beyond   language.   This   paper   will   look   at   a  
number  of  mechanisms  used  in  CL  to  explain  language  and  see  how  they  shed  
light  on  one  specific  human  area:  that  of  our  current  legal  system.  The  claim  is  
that  the  processes  that  lie  at  the  center  of  our  legal  systems  can  be  seen  from  a  
fresh   perspective   and   can   probably   be   better   understood   using   some   of   the  
mechanisms  used  in  CL.    
It  is  not  our  intention  to  provide  a  complete  and  thorough  account  of  the  
whole  English   legal   system.  Legal   systems  are  exceedingly   complex  and  have  
multiple  realms  of  application  that  depend  on  the  specific  area  involved  and  the  
viewpoint  taken:  constitutional  law,  administrative  law,  criminal  law,  financial  
law,   fiscal   law,   international   public   law,   etc.   These   different   subsystems   also  
interact  in  complex,  layered  ways,  requiring  the  careful  thought  of  specialists  to  
resolve  specific  issues.  Nonetheless,  there  is  a  common  abstract  structure  which  
underlies   all   types   of   legal   practices:   the   most   important   action   in   the  
application  of  the  law  is  to  take  a  given  action  or  event  and  classify  it  in  relation  
to   one   of   several   pre-­‐‑specified   cases.   This   process   is   in   fact   an   act   of  
“categorization”,  an  area  thoroughly  studied  by  CL.  Since  this  is  the  most  basic  
event   in   the  whole   legal   chain,  and  categorization   is   such  a  complex   issue   (as  
we  shall  see  in  Section  3),  there  are  normally  three  agents  involved:  the  first  one  
is  the  person  actually  making  the  decision  on  how  to  classify  a  given  case  (the  
“judge”).   Then   there   are   two   other   agents,   called   the   “prosecutor”   and   the  
“defense   attorney”1   that   argue   against   each   other   to   try   and   influence   the  
categorization  of  a  given  case  towards  one  direction  or  another.  The  strategies  
that   lawyers   follow   in   their  attempt   to  sway   the  categorization  process   in  one  
given   direction   typically   involve   devices   carefully   studied   in   CL,   which   are  
known  as  “framing”  (Section  4).  A  very  specific  and  common  framing  strategy  
is  the  use  of  “metaphor”;  this  will  be  the  focus  of  Section  5.  This  categorization  
process  is  actually  embedded  in  an  overarching  metaphoric  system,  since  moral  
actions   are   typically   conceptualized  metaphorically.  Our   present   legal   system  
can  be  said  to  be  based  on  one  concrete  metaphor,  the  “accountancy”  metaphor,  
by  which  moral  actions  are  given  a  concrete  value  and  people  have  to  “pay  the  
price”  depending  on  how  a  certain  action  is  graded  according  to  the  system.  We  
start  by  examining  these  morality  metaphors  in  Section  2.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  These  are  intended  as  generic  names;  the  specific  labels  of  the  persons  adopting  these  roles  
can  vary  depending  according  to  the  different  legal  systems.    
2  This  connection,  which  is  posited  by  supporters  of  “natural  law”,  is  not  as  straightforward  as  
could   be   initially   thought.   Defenders   of   “positive   law”   opt   instead   for   a   separation   of   legal  
codes   from   natural   law.   However,   this   is   a   more   technical   argument,   and   the   connections  
between  law  and  morality  seem  clear  enough  to  lay  people.  
3  Cognitive   science   has   made   some   progress   into   this   problem.   Apparently,   the  
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2. MORALITY METAPHORS: HOW WE CONCEPTUALIZE MORALITY 
The  connections  between  law  and  morality  are  quite  transparent,  and  have  been  
posited  by  many  theorists  such  as  Plato,  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Thomas  
Hobbes  and  John  Locke,  to  cite  a  few.  These  connections  are  also  present  in  the  
different   “Bills  of  Rights”  which  are   applied   internationally.2  A  basic   sense  of  
morality   is   in   all   probability   innate   in   humans   (De  Waal   2009,  Hauser   2006),  
since   it   is  also  present   in  some  primates.  For  example,   it  has  been  shown  that  
capuchin   monkeys   will   reject   a   reward   as   a   protest   when   they   see   other  
monkeys   receiving   greater   rewards   than   them,   revealing   a   basic   sense   of  
injustice  or  unfairness  (Brosnan  and  De  Waal  2003).  However,  our  current  sense  
of  morality  involves  quite  complex  mental  machinery,  including  a  sophisticated  
theory  of  mind  capacities  (Baird  and  Astington  2004).  MORALITY  is  by  definition  
an   abstract   domain,   not   directly   related   to   sensorimotor   embodiment  
grounding   devices.   As   such,   it   is   one   of   the   clearest   candidates   for  
conceptualization  using  a   cross-­‐‑domain   strategy.  Metaphor   theory  has  helped  
uncover   some   of   the   ways   in   which   morality   is   understood   across   many  
cultures,   looking   at   recurrent   linguistic   patterns   (Lakoff   and   Johnson   1980,  
Lakoff  1996).  Thus,  we  find  a  number  of  sensorimotor  domains  connected  to  the  
domain  of  MORALITY.  For  example,  we  use  the  concrete  domain  of  CLEANLINESS:  
if   something   is   clean,   then   it   is   moral,   and   something   dirty   is   something  
immoral.  So,  we  speak  of  a  dirty  trick  or  a  clean  conscience.  The  existence  of  this  
metaphor  at  a  mental   level,   that   is,   the  fact   that   there   is  a  connection  between  
both  domains  that  goes  beyond  language,  has  been  shown  experimentally,  via  
the   so-­‐‑called   “Macbeth   effect”.   Zhong   and   Liljenquist   (2006)   conducted   a  
number  of  experiments  in  which  they  showed  these  connections  through  non-­‐‑
linguistic  tasks.  In  their  experiments,  the  physical  cleansing  of  participants  had  
an  effect  on  their  feeling  of  guilt  due  to   immoral  actions;   it  also  softened  their  
judgments  of  other  persons’  misdeeds.  Conversely,  associations  with  unethical  
behavior   were   shown   to   increase   the   desire   of   physical   cleansing.   This  
connection   between   physical   cleanliness   and   morality   has   been   replicated  
experimentally   by   many   other   scholars   (e.g.,   Schnall   et   al.   2008,   Lee   and  
Schwartz   2010).   Needless   to   say,   this   is   not   the   only   metaphor   used   for  
MORALITY:   MORALITY   is   also   conceptualized   with   the   help   of   the   domain   of  
RECTITUDE.   If   something   is   moral,   it   is   straight,   and   something   immoral   is  
“crooked”   or   “bent”   (cf.   he   is   a   crooked   businessman,   I   have   always   been   straight  
with   you).   Other   additional   metaphors   are   MORALITY   AS   VERTICALITY   (cf.   an  
upstanding  citizen,  a  low  trick,  high  morals),  MORALITY  AS  BOUNDS  (cf.  going  astray,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  This  connection,  which  is  posited  by  supporters  of  “natural  law”,  is  not  as  straightforward  as  
could   be   initially   thought.   Defenders   of   “positive   law”   opt   instead   for   a   separation   of   legal  
codes   from   natural   law.   However,   this   is   a   more   technical   argument,   and   the   connections  
between  law  and  morality  seem  clear  enough  to  lay  people.  
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stepping   out   of   or   transgressing   bounds,   deviating   from   the   path)   or   MORALITY   AS  
PURITY  (cf.  pure/impure  thoughts),  to  name  a  few.    
But   probably   the   single  most   pervasive  metaphor   for  morality   found   in  
colloquial   language   relates   it   to  ACCOUNTANCY.   If   you  do   something  good   for  
someone,  that  person  “owes”  you,  or  is  “indebted”  to  you.  Equally,   if  you  carry  
out  an  immoral  action  against  someone,  that  someone  can  “make  you  pay”  for  it.  
This   can  be  done  with   an  action  of   the   same  negative   “value”   (an  action   that  
receives  the  name  of  “revenge”).  Alternatively,  you  can  carry  out  a  deed  of  the  
same  “value”  but  negative  polarity,  which  can  serve  as  “compensation”  and  set  
the  record  “even”.  
The   idea   behind   all   these   expressions   is   that   our   actions   are   given   a  
specific  value,  positive  when  they  are  good  actions  and  negative  when  they  are  
bad  actions,  and  people  keep  a  record  of  accountancy.  This  may  seem  a  rather  
“materialistic”   way   of   dealing   with   moral   actions,   but   it   is   in   fact   the   most  
pervasive  metaphor  we  have   for  dealing  with  morality.  The   translation  of   the  
moral  value  of  a  given  action  to  a  more  concrete  type  of  value  has  been  applied  
in  our   legal   systems  since   the  dawn  of   time.  All   societies  have   striven   to   find  
some  type  of  equivalence  between  these  two  poles:  depending  on  the  category  
of   the  deed,   there   is  a  “price”   to  be  paid.  Now,  different   societies   in  different  
moments  in  time  have  opted  for  different  currencies  of  such  a  price.  Sometimes  
that  currency  can  be  cows  (as  in  many  African  cultures),  pigs,  or  other  types  of  
cattle;  it  can  also  be  money  or  a  valuable  object  (e.g.  a  given  possession);  it  can  
be  years  of  prison,  or  even  the  offender’s  life.    
   For   example,   the   well-­‐‑known   Hammurabi   code   (around   1772   B.C.)  
tended   to   use   physical   harm   (‘an   eye   for   an   eye’)   in   exchange   for   moral  
misconduct,  and  listed  a  number  of  actions,  which  had  to  be  paid  for  with  a  life:    
	  
• Law  #3.   If   a  man  has   borne   false  witness   in   a   trial,   or   has  not   established   the  
statement  that  he  has  made,  if  that  case  be  a  capital  trial,  that  man  shall  be  put  to  
death.  
• Law  #15.  If  any  one  take  a  male  or  female  slave  of  the  court,  or  a  male  or  female  
slave  of  a  freed  man,  outside  the  city  gates,  he  shall  be  put  to  death.  
• Law  #22.  If  any  one  is  committing  a  robbery  and  is  caught,  then  he  shall  be  put  
to  death.  
  
	  
Other  ancient  codes   tended   to  use  money  as  compensation;   for  example,  
these  are  some  laws  in  the  Ur-­‐‑nammu  code  (2100-­‐‑2050  B.C.):    
	  
• If   a  man   commits   a   kidnapping,   he   is   to   be   imprisoned   and   pay   15   shekels   of  
silver.  
• If  a  man  divorces  his  first-­‐‑time  wife,  he  shall  pay  her  one  mina  of  silver.  If  it  is  a  
(former)  widow  whom  he  divorces,  he  shall  pay  her  half  a  mina  of  silver.    
Cognitive  Linguistics  and  the  law  
ANU.FILOL.ESTUD.LINGÜÍST., 4/2014,  pp.  185-­‐‑200,  ISSN:  2014-­‐‑1408  
189  
Similar  arrangements  are  found  in  the  Lipit-­‐‑Ishtar  code  (1870  B.C.):  
	  
	  
• (Art.	  9)	  If	  a	  man	  entered	  the	  orchard	  of	  another	  man	  and	  was	  seized	  there	  for	  
stealing,	  he	  shall	  pay	  ten	  shekels	  of	  silver	  	  
• (Art.	  36)	  If	  a	  man	  rented	  an	  ox	  and	  broke	  its	  horn,	  he	  shall	  pay	  one-­‐fourth	  its	  
price	  
  
These   two   currencies   (physical   harm,   including   death,   and   monetary  
compensation)   have   remained   among   the   most   popular   options   in   Western  
societies.   In   the   early   Germanic   societies,   they   were   applied   in   the   form   of  
Weregild   (which   established   a   concrete   price   for   every   human   being   and   for  
every  piece  of  property),  and  blood  revenge.  Thus,   if   for  example  someone  was  
killed,  the  guilty  person  would  have  to  pay  a  “weregild”  to  the  victim’s  family,  
or  otherwise  blood  revenge  would  be  taken.  
Nowadays,  the  currency  we  have  agreed  upon  is  prison  time:  each  moral  
action   (after   it   has   been   carefully   categorized;   see   section   3)   is   “valid”   for   a  
number  of  years.  Thus,  a  person  guilty  of  “arson”  may  have  to  go  to  prison  for  
5  years,  somebody  guilty  of  “murder”  may  have  to  go  to  prison  for  30-­‐‑50  years  
(depending  on  the  legal  system  applied),  etc.  Each  action  is  thus  put  in  a  given  
category  (e.g.,  first-­‐‑degree  murder,  second-­‐‑degree,  third-­‐‑degree,  etc.),  and  each  
category   is   associated   with   a   given   value   in   terms   of   years   of   prison.   The  
process   of   categorization   is   in   this  way   crucial   and   completely   central   to   the  
whole  enterprise;  this  is  what  we  examine  in  our  next  Section  3.  
  
3. PROTOTYPE CATEGORIZATION 
In   the   1970s,   psychologist   Eleanor   Rosch   conducted   a   number   of   elegant  
experiments   that   establish   a   new   perspective   on   how   people   form   categories  
(Rosch   1973,   1975,   1978).   In   the   classic,   Aristotelian   approach,   categorization  
was  concerned  with   finding   the  necessary  and  sufficient   features  common   for  
all   members   of   a   given   category.   The   application   of   this   list   of   features  
produced,   as   a   result,   a  number  of   sharply  defined   categories.  Belonging   to   a  
given  category  was  thus  established  binarily  (by  inclusion  or  exclusion)  and  all  
members   of   the   categories   had   exactly   the   same   status.   In   the   new   approach  
introduced  by  Rosch  and  her  colleagues,  the  categorization  of  a  given  element  is  
carried  out  with  respect  to  the  most  typical  and  best  exemplar  of  the  category;  
the  tighter  the  fit,   the  most  centrally  an  element  is  placed  within  the  category.  
The  system  also  allows  for  peripheral  categorization,  in  which  elements  which  
diverge   to  a  certain  extent   from  the  prototype  can  still  be   included  within   the  
category,   in   a   less   central  position.  There   is  no   set   of  necessary  and   sufficient  
features  that  can  be  applied  to  all  members  of  the  category,  which  are  related  by  
“family   resemblances”   (Wittgenstein   1957).   Prototypical   members   share   a  
higher  number  of   features  with   the   rest,  while  peripheral  members   can   share  
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only   some   features,   but   not   others.   An   essential   feature   of   this   type   of  
categorization  is  that  categories  are  not  “binary”:  belonging  to  a  given  category  
can  be  a  matter  of  degree.  Categories  are   thus   fuzzy,  and  can  merge   into  one  
another.   This   fact   has   a   great   relevance   for   law   practice,   because   the  
expectations   now   are   that   only   very   prototypical   actions   will   be   easily  
categorized,  and  there  exists  the  possibility  of  finding  intermediate  cases,  which  
can  be  accommodated  by  two  partially  overlapping  categories.    
Another  important  and  related  fact  is  that  categories  are  not  “out  there”  in  
nature,  but  are  created  by  conceptualizers   (Lakoff  1987).  Thus,  a   category   is  a  
mental   construct   that   helps   us   organize   our   behavior,   and   that   justifies   its  
existence  by  its  usefulness,  more  than  by  its  “truth  value”.  We  can  predict  how  
an   element  will   behave   depending   on   how  we   categorize   it,   since   one   of   the  
main  purposes  of  categorization  is  to  transfer  information  from  one  exemplar  to  
another.   If   based   on   visual   information   alone   we   are   able   to   categorize   one  
specific  piece  of  fruit  within  the  category  “apple”,  the  information  that  we  may  
have  about  other  members  of   the   category   (e.g.   that   they  are   edible)  becomes  
available   for   that   specific   exemplar   as   well.   Different   animals   categorize   the  
world   depending   on   their   specific   needs;   different   cultures   do   the   same.   The  
non-­‐‑objectivist   view   of   the   world   that   is   associated   with   prototypical  
categorization  is  again  of  great  importance  to  legal  practice,  since  it  is  essential  
to  find  the  right  epistemic  framework  in  which  legal  decisions  take  place.  
Finally,  categorization,  and,  specifically,  linguistic  categorization,  is  not  an  
innocent  or  neutral  act.  Work  in  cognitive  psychology  has  proven  that  using  a  
linguistic   label   for  an  element  changes   its   representation   in  our  minds.   It   is  an  
invitation   to   focus  on   the  similarities  with   the  other  members  of   the  category,  
on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  differences  with  non-­‐‑members  of  the  category,  on  
the   other.   For   example,   in   a   series   of   experiments,   Lupyan   (2008a)   asked  
participants   to   examine   a   number   of   familiar   objects   (e.g.,   chairs,   lamps   and  
tables).  Sometimes  participants  had  to  classify  the  objects  using  a  “preference”  
rule   (by   pushing   a   “like”   or   a   “don’t   like”   button);   sometimes   they   had   to  
classify  them  using  a  linguistic  label  (by  pushing  a  “chair”  or  a  “table”  button).  
In   a   second   phase   of   the   experiment,   they   were   shown   again   a   number   of  
objects;  these  objects  could  be  either  the  same  they  had  previously  seen  or  slight  
variations   of   them   (e.g.,   a   chair   with   a   slightly   different   height,   color   or  
material).  This   time,   they  had   to  press   the  buttons  “new”  or  “old”   to   indicate  
whether   they  had  already   seen   them  or  not.   In   a  very   consistent  way,  people  
remembered   more   accurately   the   elements   they   had   categorized   using   the  
“like/don’t  like”  rule,  compared  to  those  they  had  categorized  using  a  linguistic  
label.  Categorizing  an  element  with  an  explicit  linguistic  label  thus  brought  its  
mental   representation   closer   to   the   prototype,   and  made   people   focus   on   the  
similarities   to   the   prototype.   Aspects   that   are   deemed   less   relevant   for   the  
categorization   process   (i.e.,  within-­‐‑category   differences),   receive   less   attention  
(and   are   thus   more   easily   forgotten).   This   explains   why   it   is   such   a   crucial  
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matter   to   discuss   each   of   the   individual   features   that   can   associate   a   given  
action  to  a  legal  prototype.  When  a  lawyer  succeeds  in  establishing  a  connection  
between   even   just   one   single   category-­‐‑related   feature   and   the   action   being  
categorized,   other   aspects   of   the   case   that   make   it   more   similar   to   this   legal  
category   become   highlighted.   This   “gravitational   pull”   of   the   prototypical  
center,  so  to  speak,  can  alter  the  perception  of  the  whole  action,  which  is  in  this  
way   dynamically   shifted   to   accommodate   it   to   the   prototype,   in   a   sort   of  
“winner-­‐‑takes-­‐‑all”  effect.  
Due  to  the  inherently  multifaceted  nature  of  most  elements,  categorization  
can  be  a  highly  problematic  issue  (Geeraerts  1989).  In  the  case  of  moral  actions,  
the  process   is   further  complicated  by  one  very  specific  and  critical  parameter:  
the   intentionality   of   the  wrongdoer.   In  most   cases,   in   order   to   determine   the  
morality  of  an  action  and  categorize  it  accordingly,  we  need  to  “guess”  what  the  
intentions   of   the   accused   person   were.  What   was   the   purpose   of   the   person  
carrying  out  the  offending  action?  What  was  on  his/her  mind?  Answering  this  
requires  deep  theory-­‐‑of-­‐‑mind  capabilities,  by  which  we  infer  the  mental  states  
of   an   actor   (e.g.,   his/her   beliefs   and   intentions).3   This   is   in   all   probability   the  
single  most  controversial  issue  in  moral  categorization,  a  problem  that  has  been  
acknowledged   in   all   moral   and   legal   codes.   For   example,   while   the   generic  
Hebrew  word  for  any  kind  of  sin  is  aveira  (“transgression”),  Judaism  describes  
three  levels  of  sin:  
	  
1. Pesha  —  an  “intentional  sin”;  an  action  committed  in  deliberate  defiance  of  
God  
2.   Avon  —  a  “sin  of  lust  or  uncontrollable  emotion,  committed  against  one’s  
will  and  is  not  in  line  with  one’s  true  inner  desires”.  It  is  a  sin  done  
knowingly,  but  not  done  to  defy  God  
3. Chet  —   an   “unintentional   sin”,   something   that   is   done   but   without   the  
intention  to  sin  
	  
The  categories  we  find  in  most  legal  systems  nowadays  do  in  fact  depend  
on  this  thorny  issue:  the  intentionality  of  the  agent.  This  is  what  underlies,  for  
example,  the  distinction  between  the  two  main  cases  in  which  a  person  causes  
the  death  of  another:  manslaughter  vs.  murder.  Thus,  an  action  is  categorized  as  
“involuntary  manslaughter”  when  the  agent  has  carried  out  an  (illegal)  act  that  
was  likely  to  harm  another  person,  and  indeed  caused  someone  to  die,  but  such  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Cognitive   science   has   made   some   progress   into   this   problem.   Apparently,   the  
Temporoparietal  Junction,  an  area  of  the  bran  where  the  temporal  and  parietal  lobes  meet  and  
which   is   involved   in   the   association   of   emotions   to   events   or   individuals,   is   crucial   in  moral  
reasoning.   Some   experiments   have   shown   that   disruption   of   the   neural   activity   in   this   area  
using   the   technique   known   as   TMS   (Transcranial  Magnetic   Stimulation),   (Young   et   al.,   2010)  
affects  our  capacity  to  use  mental  states  in  moral  judgment.    
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a   consequence   of   the   action  was   neither   foreseen   nor   intended   by   the   agent.  
Dropping   a   brick   from  a   bridge,   for   example,   could  be  done  with  no   specific  
intention  of  killing,  but  if  it  the  action  results  in  the  death  of  someone,  the  agent  
is  guilty  of  extreme  recklessness  (in  English  law,  this  would  receive  the  name  of  
“constructive   manslaughter”).   In   contrast,   the   category   “voluntary  
manslaughter”   is   applied   to   cases   in   which   a   person   kills   another   one   with  
malice   and   intentionality   (i.e.,   the   action   is   carried   out   with   the   intention   of  
causing   harm   or   even   killing),   but   the   action   itself   had   not   been   previously  
planned.  Such  would  be  the  case  of  someone  killing  a  person  in  a  sudden  fight  
(this  is  sometimes  called  “chance-­‐‑medley”  in  English  law).  Extreme  provocation  
is  another  of  the  attenuating  factors  that  can  push  the  classification  of  an  act  of  
killing  from  murder  to  manslaughter.  Finally,  there  is  the  category  of  “murder”,  
which  is  the  unlawful4  killing  of  a  person.  In  this  case,  the  person  intends  to  kill  
the  victim  and  carries  out  a  deliberate  and  premeditated  action  with  the  result  
of  death.  There  are  an  additional  number  of  circumstances  that  can  displace  the  
case  within  the  radial  prototypical  space  of  the  category,  bringing  it  towards  the  
center  or   the  periphery,  and   thus  making   the  case  more  or   less  serious.  These  
are  known  as  “mitigating”  or  “aggravating”  circumstances.  Thus,  depending  on  
the  different  legal  systems,  mitigating  circumstances  can  include  insanity,  post-­‐‑
partum  depression  or  diminished  capacity,  among  other   factors.  On   the  other  
hand,   aggravating   circumstances   can  be   features   such  as   exceptional  brutality  
or   cruelty,   or   sometimes   depend   on   the   type   of   victim   involved   (e.g.,   the  
murder  of  a  pregnant  woman,  of  a  police  officer,  a   judge,  a   fireman,  or  of   the  
witness  to  a  crime  can  all  be  aggravating  circumstances).    
	  
4. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE: FRAMING SYSTEMS 
As   we   have   mentioned   previously,   categorization   is   not   an   easy   business.  
Humans   have   the   capacity   to   focus   on   any   of   the   perceived   attributes   or  
components   of   an   element  depending  on   contextual  needs   (Labov  1973).  This  
means  that  depending  on  the  attribute  we  focus  on,  we  can  group  a  given  object  
along  with  an  indefinite  number  of  other  different  objects  with  which  it  shares  
the   specific   characteristic  we   have   selected.   To   give   but   a   trivial   example,   an  
“apple”  can  be  grouped  within  the  category  of  “fruit”  (along  with  other  items  
such  as  bananas  and  pears),  but  it  can  also  be  grouped  with  “items  that  can  be  
bought   in   a   supermarket”   (along   with   chicken,   milk,   coffee   and   all   sorts   of  
domestic  cleaning  products);  it  can  also  be  grouped  with  “healthy  food”  (along  
with  whole-­‐‑wheat  and  omega-­‐‑3-­‐‑fish),  with  “round  objects”   (along  with   tennis  
balls   or   eggs),  with   “red   objects”   (if   the   apple   is   red),   or   in   a   possibly   open-­‐‑
ended   list   of   ad-­‐‑hoc   categories   (Barsalou   1983).   Each   of   these   categorizations  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  There  are  a  number  of  cases  in  which  a  man  can  legally  kill  another  one  (again,  as  always,  
depending   on   the   different   legal   systems),   such   as   soldiers   in  wars,   self-­‐‑defense   cases,   or   an  
executioner  who  carries  out  the  orders  of  the  state.  
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imposes   a   different   viewpoint   on   the   element   itself,   highlighting   some   facets  
while   leaving   some   others   in   the   background,   out   of   the   attention   of   the  
cognizer.   As   mentioned   previously,   categorizing   maximizes   both   within-­‐‑
category  similarities  and  between-­‐‑category  differences.  
Now,   linguistic   descriptions   impose   specific   viewpoints   of   the   scene  
described  in  ways  that  go  beyond  the  mere  choice  between  one  lexical  category  
or   another   for   a   given   element.   Think   of   a   scene   in   which   a   boy   breaks   a  
window   by   throwing   a   ball   at   it.   This   event   can   be   coded   linguistically   in  
different  ways,  and  each  of  them  imposes  a  different  perspective  on  the  scene.  
Thus,   “the   boy   broke   the  window”  brings   the  agent,   the  boy,   into   full   focus.  We  
can  alternatively  say,  “a  ball  broke  the  window”,  thus  hiding  the  role  of  the  agent.  
Or  we  can  even  choose  to  focus  solely  on  the  result  of  the  event  by  saying  “the  
window  broke”.  These  would  be  examples  of  “windowing  of  attention”   (Talmy  
2000),  by  which  language  is  assimilated  to  the  “focus”  of  a  spotlight  that  selects  
parts  of  a  scene,  leaving  others  in  the  dark.  
Fausey   and   Boroditsky   (2010)   conducted   a   number   of   experiments   that  
confirmed  the  all-­‐‑important  role  of  linguistic  framing  in  the  attribution  of  blame  
and   financial   liability.   For   example,   participants  would   read   a   story   about   an  
individual  (‘Mrs.  Smith’),  who  became  accidentally  involved  in  a  restaurant  fire.  
There  were  two  versions  of  the  story,  which  were  identical  except  for  the  verbal  
frame  used  in  the  description  of  the  accidental  event:  one  used  a  transitive  (and  
thus,  agentive)  frame:  e.g.,  Mrs.  Smith  flopped  the  napkin  on  the  centerpiece  candle.  
The   other   version  used   an   intransitive   (and   thus,   non-­‐‑agentive)   verbal   frame:  
e.g.,  her  napkin  flopped  on  the  centerpiece  candle.  Participants  who  had  been  given  
the   transitive   version   tended   to   attribute  more   blame   to  Mrs.   Smith   and   also  
thought   that   she   should  be   required   to  pay  more  money   to   the   restaurant   for  
damages.  In  another  experiment  in  the  series,  participants  watched  a  video:  the  
well-­‐‑known   and   controversial   incident   which   took   place   during   the   2004   US  
Super   Bowl   finals,   in   which   Justin   Timberlake   ripped   the   costume   of   Janet  
Jackson,   exposing   her   bare   breast.   Participants   were   provided   again   with   a  
verbal  description  that  contained  an  agentive  version  of  the  incident  (he  ripped  
the  costume)  or  a  non-­‐‑agentive  one  (the  costume  ripped).  Though  all  participants  
watched  the  same  video,  participants  who  heard  the  transitive  version  tended  
to   attribute  more   blame   on   Justin   Timberlake   and   less   on   chance   than   those  
given   the   intransitive   version.   They   also   tended   to   think   that   the   financial  
responsibility  of  Timberlake  was  higher.  This  experiment  shows  how  the  way  
in  which  we  construe  an  event,  and  specifically,  the  attribution  of  blame,  can  be  
greatly  influenced  by  the  linguistic  choices  we  make  for  its  description,  even  in  
the  case  of  eyewitnesses.    
Filipovic   (2013a)   is   another   study   that   compares   witness   memory   in  
speakers   of  different   languages.  Her   study   compares   the   expression  of   causal  
intentionality  in  English  and  Spanish.  In  English,  a  sentence  such  as  “she  dropped  
the  keys”  is  ambiguous  with  respect  to  intentionality.  In  Spanish,  the  expression  
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of   intentional   vs.   non-­‐‑intentional   actions   is   quite   clear,   since   non-­‐‑intentional  
actions  are  expressed  with  a  different  construction   (‘se   le   cayeron   las   llaves’).   In  
her  experiments,  she  showed  how  this  language-­‐‑guided  habit  of  distinguishing  
intentional   from   non-­‐‑intentional   readings   favorably   affected   the   witness  
memory   of   Spanish   speakers   as   compared   to   English   speakers.   The   lack   of  
pressure   of   English   speakers   to   express   in   a   linguistically   explicit   way   the  
causation   component   made   them   pay   less   attention   to   it   and   accordingly  
weakened  their  memory  of  it.  Other  researchers  have  also  found  differences  in  
eyewitness  memory  of   intentional  actions   (e.g.,  English  vs.   Japanese   speakers,  
Fausey   et   al.   2010;   or   English   vs.   Spanish   speakers,   Fausey   and   Boroditsky  
2011).   Filipovic   (2013b)   also   focuses   on   a   number   of   typological   language  
contrasts,  specifically,  the  expression  of  motion  and  of  causation,  showing  their  
crucial   importance   for   “witness   interviewing,   interpreting,   translating,  
remembering,  and  forming  judgment  in  legally  relevant  contexts”.    
All  these  works  issue  a  very  strict  warning  about  the  type  of  translations  
which  are  used  in  court  proceedings;  Filipovic  (2007)  reports  a  case  in  which  a  
Spanish-­‐‑speaking  individual  in  a  Northern  California  court  described  an  event  
with   a   non-­‐‑agentive   frame   (‘se  me   cayó’   –   ‘it   dropped   –   from  me’)  which  was  
erroneously  translated  in  court  using  a  agentive  English  equivalent  (‘I  dropped  
her’).  As  has  been  shown  here,  the  attribution  of  blame  is  greatly  affected  by  the  
type   of   linguistic   framing   used,   and   all   subjects   involved   in   legal   procedures  
should  be  well  aware  of  this.  
In   all   the   cases   described   above,   the   framing   effect   is   brought   about   by  
means   of   focusing   on   certain   elements   within   a   frame,   putting   others   in   the  
background  (Talmy’s  windowing  of  attention).  But  this  is  not  the  only  possible  
framing   strategy:   in   CL  words   are   understood  with   respect   to   an   underlying  
frame   (Fillmore   1982).   Frames   are   complex   entities,   typically   containing   a  
number   of   different   elements;   these   frame   elements   can   be   activated   by  
different  words,  therefore  highlighting  a  selected  portion  of  the  frame  structure  
and  imposing  a  given  perspective.  When  we  use  one  word,  the  other  elements  
in  its  frame  are  also  activated.  For  example,  in  a  commercial  transaction  frame,  
a  “salesperson”  is  the  person  employed  by  a  business  to  sell  its  merchandise  to  
customers.   Thus,   using   the   single   word   “salesperson”   will   automatically  
activate   all   these   related   concepts.   The  word   “pusher”   (as   in   “drug-­‐‑pusher”)  
makes   reference   to   a   similar   event   (a   commercial   transaction),   but   the   frame  
elements   are   now   different:   the   thing   that   is   sold/bought   is   “drug”,   the  
transaction   does   not   take   place   typically   in   a   shop,   and   the   customers   are  
substance-­‐‑abusers.   Quite   often,   near-­‐‑synonyms   make   references   to   very  
different  frames,  and  changing  one  word  even  for  a  very  similar  one,  can  have  a  
dramatic  effect  (in  the  famous  words  of  Dwight  Bolinger,  language  is  a  loaded  
weapon).   Coulson   (2011)   has   studied   the   phenomenon   known   as   “frame-­‐‑
shifting”:   classifying   a   child   as   a   “cry-­‐‑baby”   or   as   a   “highly-­‐‑sensitive   child”  
alters   dramatically   the   type   of   response   that   is   appropriate   for   each   case.   If  
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somebody  is  described  as  “thrifty”,  we  apply  by  default  the  reasons  this  person  
may  have   for   not   spending  money   (probably,   frugality   or  moderation);   if   the  
description   applied   to   the   person   is   “stingy”,   the   reasons   for   not   spending  
money  would  be  assumed  to  be  different  (probably,  greed  or  selfishness).    
Cognitive   linguistics   has   studied   how   the   language  we  use   is   inevitably  
associated  with  a  given  framing  and  how  this  can  be  put   to  use   in  persuasive  
functions   (Bizer   and   Petty   2005,   Fausey   and   Matlock   2011,   Goffman   1974,  
Lakoff   1996b,   2004,   2008).   This   is   why,   for   example,   American   conservative  
politicians  are  advised  not  to  use  the  phrase  “drilling  for  oil”,  and  opt  instead  
for  the  more  neutral  and  positively  connoted  “exploring  for  energy”.  Even  the  
most  innocent  of  words  “drags”  with  it  a  number  of  conjoined  elements,  taken  
from   its   background   frame,  which   can   color   the  word  with   connotations   and  
contribute   to   it   a   number   of   default   assumptions   which   are   unconsciously  
present.   As   Todd  Gitlin   put   it:   “Frames   are   principles   of   selection,   emphasis  
and   presentation   composed   of   little   tacit   theories   about   what   exists,   what  
happens,  and  what  matters”   (Gitlin  1980:  6).  The  use  of   framing   in   rhetoric   is  
thus  of  the  utmost  importance  for  legal  practitioners,  i.e.,  for  those  who  hope  to  
present  a  given  event  in  a  specific  light  so  that  certain  interpretations,  inferences  
and  explanatory  schemes  are  encouraged  at  the  expense  of  competing  ones.    
  
5. FRAMING-BY-METAPHOR 
Abstract   concepts,   by   definition,   are   not   directly   grounded   in   our   embodied  
experience  (i.e.,  we  do  not  see  them,  touch  them,  smell  them,  etc.).  Conceptual  
Metaphor  Theory  proposes  a  mechanism  by  which  the  embodied  grounding  of  
concrete,   sensorimotor   domains   (Barsalou   2008)   is   analogically   extended   to  
abstract  concepts,  which  become  in  this  way  more  consistently  structured  and  
better   understood.   This   transfer   of   inferences   from   a   concrete   domain   to   an  
abstract  domain  allows  a  type  of  reasoning  that  would  not  be  possible  without  
this  connection.  Lakoff  and  his  colleagues  have  in  fact  proposed  that  all  abstract  
concepts  are  based  on  metaphor  (Lakoff  and  Johnson  1980,  1999).    
Metaphors   are   also   framing   devices:   they   invite   the   hearer   to   form   a  
conceptualization   from  a  given  perspective.5  Lawyers  have  been  aware  of   this  
for  a   long  time;   in   this  sense,  metaphors  have  always  been  used  for  rhetorical  
purposes.  For   example,   classical   scholars   such  as  Quintilian  or  Cicero  already  
mentioned  them  in  their  treatises  on  persuasive  mechanisms.  Metaphors  often  
bring  emotional  overtones  and  forceful  arguments,  justifying  their  usefulness  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5   Though   this   section   is   going   to  discuss   the   role   of   conceptual  metaphor   in   argumentative  
settings,   it  must  be  mentioned  that  this   is  not  "ʺthe  only  game  in  town"ʺ  within  CL.  Conceptual  
Integration   Theory,   also   known   as   Blending   Theory   (Fauconnier   and   Turner   2008),   a   more  
complex  and  dynamic  cross-­‐‑domain  mapping  model,  has  also  been  applied   in   these  contexts.  
See  for  example,  Pascual  (2006)  or  Yao  and  Pascual  (in  prep)  for  studies  of  blending  used  as  an  
argumentative  strategy  in  legal  settings.  
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legal  practice.  Recent  studies  have  been  able   to  connect   this  classic  practice   to  
the   theoretical   insights   of   cognitive   linguistics.   Thus,   metaphors   have   been  
discussed   in  connection  with  contract   law   (Lipshaw  2011)  and   legal  discourse  
(Chiu  and  Chiang  2011);  they  have  also  been  proposed  as  the  basis  for  models  
of  legal  theory  (Makela  2011).  Another  interesting  study  is  Hibbitts  (1994),  who  
offered  a  discussion  of  the  change  from  visual  to  aural  metaphors  in  American  
legal   practice.   On   the   website   “www.thecompletelawyer.com”,   we   are   told  
explicitly  that  “lawyers  can  use  metaphoric  re-­‐‑framing  to  shift  readers’  understanding  
of  their  arguments  and  smooth  the  way  toward  conclusions  favorable  to  their  clients”.  
The  same  argument   is   found   in  Linda  Berger’s  work  “What   is   the  Sound  of  a  
Corporation   Speaking?   How   the   Cognitive   Theory   of   Metaphor   Can   Help  
Lawyers  Shape  the  Law”:  
	  
The   lawyer  who  wants   to   influence   judicial  perceptions  and  decisions   can  draw  on   the  
insights   of   cognitive   research.   A   new   metaphor   can   make   the   target   experience  
understandable   in   a   different   light   by   highlighting   some   aspects   of   the   target   and  
suppressing   others.   The   new   metaphor   may   entail   very   specific   aspects   of   the   source  
concept,   and   in   this   way,   it   can   give   the   target   a   new   meaning,   sanctioning   different  
actions,   justifying   revised   inferences,   and   leading   to  different   goals   and   results   (Berger  
2004:  207).  
	  
A  recent  study  by  Thibodeau  and  Boroditsky  (2011)  has  been  able  to  test  
experimentally   the   influence   of  metaphor   on   reasoning.   They   examined   how  
different  metaphors  affected   the   judgments  of   subjects  about  crime  and  about  
how   this   problem   should   be   addressed   by   society.   In   their   experiment,   they  
gave   participants   two   texts   describing   the   same   situation:   an   increase   in   the  
crime   rate   of   the   imaginary   city   of   Addison.   The   texts   contained   the   same  
information,   but  made   use   of   two   different  metaphors   to   describe   crime.   So,  
while  Text  A  used  the  metaphor  CRIME  IS  A  DISEASE  (describing  crime  as  a  “virus  
infecting   the   city”   and   “plaguing   the   neighborhoods”),   Text   B   used   the  
metaphor   CRIME   IS   A   BEAST   (describing   crime   as   a   “wild   beast   preying   on   the  
city”  and  “lurking  in  neighborhoods”).  After  reading  one  of  the  versions  of  this  
text,  participants  had  to  propose  a  number  of  solutions.  The  solutions  proposed  
were  found  to  be  influenced  by  the  metaphor  used  in  the  text.  So,  participants  
who   had   read   the   text   with   the   crime-­‐‑as-­‐‑disease   metaphor   tended   to   favor  
“social  reform-­‐‑like”  solutions  (e.g.  improving  social  programs,  providing  better  
health-­‐‑care,   etc.),   while   those   who   read   the   text   that   used   the   crime-­‐‑as-­‐‑beast  
metaphor   tended   to   favor   “enforcement-­‐‑like”   solutions   (e.g.,   harsher   prison  
penalties,   building   more   jails,   etc.).   In   this   way,   these   results   were   able   to  
demonstrate   that  metaphor   influences   people’s   reasoning   in   a  way   similar   to  
frames:   metaphors   were   able   to   provide   a   structured   framework   for  
understanding  the  abstract  notion  of  crime.  Metaphors  also  prompted  a  biased  
perspective   of   the   issue   at   hand   (building   a   virus-­‐‑like   or   a   beast-­‐‑like  mental  
representation   of   crime)   and   motivated   a   number   of   consistent   inferences.  
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Incidentally,  subjects  reported  not  being  aware  of  the  type  of  metaphor  that  had  
been   used,  which   in   one   of   the   experiments  was   activated  with   just   a   single  
word  (‘crime’/’beast’).     
  
6. CONCLUSION 
CL  has  developed  a  number  of  strategies  for  the  analysis  of   language  that  can  
be  usefully  applied  to  other  cognitive  processes  as  well.  In  this  paper,  we  have  
reviewed   some   of   these   basic   strategies   and  have   examined  how   they   can   be  
applied   to   the   domain   of   legal   practice.   We   have   seen   how   the   domain   of  
morality  itself,  which  serves  as  a  backdrop  for  legal  systems  all  over  the  world,  
is   structured   metaphorically.   The   way   we   organize   our   moral   (and   legal)  
systems  is  thus  a  perfect  example  of  one  of  those  “metaphors  we  live  by”.  Our  
current   legal   systems  can  be  described  as  an   implementation  of   the  metaphor  
MORALITY   AS   ACCOUNTANCY.   Politicians   use   this  metaphor   when   they   discuss  
different   laws,  negotiate   the  different  “prices”   that  our  actions  may  have,  and  
adjust  in  complex  ways  debts  to  be  paid  to  society.  The  strategies  that  lawyers  
use   to   influence   the   decision   of   the   judge   (or   the   jury)   and   bias   a   given   case  
towards  one  category  or  another,  shifting  the  case  towards  the  prototype  or  the  
periphery  of  a  given  category,  are  in  fact  mechanisms  that  have  been  studied  by  
cognitive   linguistics,   under   the   labels   of   windowing   of   attention,   linguistic  
framing   and   framing-­‐‑by-­‐‑metaphor.   The   psychological   reality   of   these  
mechanisms   has   been   solidly   established   by   abundant   empirical   research,   as  
has  been   their  effect  on  memory,  attention,   reasoning  and   inferencing.  As  has  
been  shown,  cognitive  linguistics  can  thus  help  to  explain  matters  central  to  law  
practice,  including  such  specific  factors  as  differences  in  eyewitness  memory,  or  
the  parameters  that  intervene  in  the  attribution  of  blame  and  guilt.    
Taken   all   together,   these   results   should   be   of   great   interest   to   all  
participants   involved   in   the   legal  process.  A  better  understanding  of   how  we  
organize   our   moral   world   and   a   more   precise   view   of   the   psychological  
mechanisms   involved   in   our   current   legal   practices   can   only   add   to   our   own  
benefit  and  to  a  better  application  of  our  laws.    
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